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COPYRIGHT LAW:
MISUSE

DOCTRINE

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S EXTENSION OF THE
TO THE AREA OF COPYRIGHT: A Mis-

USE OF THE MISUSE DOCTRINE?-Lasercomb America, Inc. v.

Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent case of Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit extended the
patent misuse defense to the area of copyright law, creating a separate
copyright misuse defense.' Since the development of the patent misuse
doctrine, courts have struggled to determine if a similar misuse doctrine applies to copyright infringement. A review of the lower court
decisions considering the issue reveals no clear consensus. 3 The Supreme Court has created much of the confusion by failing to adequately address the copyright misuse issue.
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court first enunciated the
patent misuse doctrine and permitted its use as a defense to an infringement action without requiring a showing of an antitrust violation
under the Clayton or Sherman Acts." In recent years, however, courts
have considered whether antitrust analysis should be an element of
misuse. 5 Despite the trend toward incorporating principles of antitrust
analysis into the misuse doctrine, the Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb held

1. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
2. Id. "[Slince copyright and patent law serve parallel public interests, a 'misuse' defense
should apply . . . to vindicate either right." Id. at 976.
3. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, § 9.6 (1989); WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 4.09 (1990); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVIC NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §

13.09 (1990).

4. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942) (use of patent to extend
patent grant constitutes patent misuse). Section I of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act states: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section
14 of the Clayton Act states: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale . . . where the effect of such
lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C § 14
(1988).
5. See Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
905 (1986). "Recent economic analysis questions the rationale behind holding any licensing practice per se anticompetitive." Id. at 1001 n.9; accord USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694
F.2d 505, 510-12 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983). The Supreme Court's
public policy rationale of Morton Salt "is too vague a formulation to be useful; taken seriously it
would put all patent rights at hazard." USM, 694 F.2d at 510. See infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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that establishing an antitrust violation is not necessary to successfully
raise the misuse defense. 6
The decision in Lasercomb, to extend the misuse defense to copyright, will have significant ramifications in an infringement action. A
plaintiff who is found to have misused the copyright is prevented from
enforcing the copyright for as long as the misuse continues.7 Moreover,
any defendant, not just those affected by the misuse, may raise the
defense of copyright misuse.8 Although several circuit courts have recognized the copyright misuse doctrine, 9 the Fourth Circuit is the first
circuit court to explicitly bar an infringement action on the basis of
copyright misuse."
This casenote first examines the underlying policies of copyright
and patent law. Next, this casenote examines the development of both
the patent and copyright misuse doctrines prior to the decision in
Lasercomb. This casenote then focuses on the facts of the Lasercomb
case and the Fourth Circuit's rationale for establishing the copyright
misuse defense. Finally, this casenote concludes that the Fourth Circuit's extension of the misuse doctrine to copyright was inappropriate
for two reasons. First, the court failed to consider the recent trend of
incorporating antitrust analysis into the misuse doctrine. Second, the
court overemphasized the public policy rationale associated with the
patent misuse doctrine. The unfortunate effect is that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the copyright misuse doctrine will continue to
create confusion in the lower courts as well as in the minds of copyright
holders.

II. BACKGROUND
The doctrine of misuse is well entrenched in the area of patent
law." Prior to the decision in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,1 2
however, the question of whether a similar misuse doctrine existed in

6. 911 F.2d at 978.
7. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
8. Id.
9. United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610-12 (8th Cir. 1988); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley-Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir.
1986); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 413 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc.,
497 F.2d 285, 290 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
10. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976; see also Alan Cooper, Loosen up on Copyrights, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 3, 1990, at 6, col. 3.
II. See generally DAVID CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.04[2] (1988).
12. 911 F.2d at 970. It is important to note that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Lasercomb
is only controlling in the fourth circuit and does not resolve the issue with regard to the other
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
circuits.
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the area of copyright law remained unanswered.1 3 To understand the
concept of copyright misuse it is first necessary to understand the
basics of copyright and patent law. In addition, it is important to examine the development and scope of both the patent misuse doctrine
and the copyright misuse doctrine as each existed prior to the decision
in Lasercomb.
A.

General Principles of the Patent and Copyright Acts

The United States Constitution provides that Congress has the
power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 4 Pursuant to this constitutional provision, Congress enacted the Patent Act' 5 and the Copyright
Act. 6 Although both acts derive from the same constitutional provision, each takes a very different approach.
1. Patent Principles
Patents serve a dual purpose in the United States. Not only does a patent provide incentive for the inventor, but society benefits by gaining
technology and making investment in its marketing
knowledge of new
17
attractive.
more
To obtain a patent one must invent or discover a new or useful
item.' 8 The item must be one that is non-obvious "to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains."' 9 In exchange for the benefit to society, patent law affords a patentee a limited monopoly20 over the item: "the right to exclude others from mak13. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, § 9.6; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, §
13.09[A].
14. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.8.
15. 35 U.S.C. §8 101-376 (1988).
16. 17 U.S.C. §8 101-810 (1988).
17. FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS & TRADEMARKS 29
(1989).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id.
19. Id. § 103. Section 103 of title 35 of the United States Code states:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
20. The limited monopoly created by a patent lasts for a period of seventeen years. Id. §
154. But see United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
[A] patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly . . . .The term monopoly connotes the
Published
by eCommons,
privilege for buying, selling, working or using a thing which the
of an exclusive1991
giving
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ing, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States. '2 1
"The exclusive right to 'make, use and vend the invention or discovery'
which Congress has long granted patentees, is thus a legal monopoly
exempt from the more general proscription of trade restraints and monopolization under early common law and more recent antitrust statutes."'2 2 In exchange for this limited monopoly the patentee is required
to "make full disclosure for the benefit of the public of the manner of
making and using the invention, and that upon the expiration of the
patent the public be left free to use the invention." 23
2.

Copyright Principles

"The overreaching object of copyright law in the United States is
to encourage the widest possible production and dissemination of literary, musical and artistic works. 12 ' The Copyright Act achieves this
goal by providing copyright holders with certain exclusive rights over
their copyrighted materials.2 5 To qualify for copyright protection an

public freely enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from the people.
An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives
something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.
Id. at 186; see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983,
1006 (1970) (discussing possible protection afforded by an "absolute monopoly").
21. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
22. WARD S. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 2 (1973).
23. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945) (holding that a patent
holder may not by contract or any form of private arrangement withhold from the public the use
of the invention of an expired patent); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (full disclosure
requirement).
24. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 4; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Section 106 states:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of a copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
Id. The exceptions to these exclusive rights set out in sections 107 through 118 are as follows: fair
use, section 107; reproduction by libraries, section 108; transfer of particular copies, section 109;
exemption of certain performances and displays, section 110; secondary transmissions, section 111;
ephemeral recordings, section 112; exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,
section 113; sound recordings, section 114; compulsory license in phonorecords, section 115; coinoperated phonorecord players, section 116; computer programs, section 117; and use in noncomhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
mercial broadcasting, section 118. Id. §§ 107-118.
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author's work must be original. 6 Unlike patent protection, copyright
protection only extends to the expression of an idea and not to the idea
itself. 7 Consistent with the constitutional mandate that the length of
the monopoly be limited,28 the exclusive rights afforded to copyright
holders exist for a specified period.2 9 The length of time the copyright
30
will exist depends on the manner in which the material is created.
The period of protection provided for a copyright, however, is substantially longer than that provided for a patented article."
B.

The Patent Misuse Doctrine

The Supreme Court premiered the "patent misuse" doctrine in
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.32 The patent misuse defense is
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). The Supreme Court commenting on the originality requirement has stated:
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently
created by the author . . and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity
. . . . To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount
will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some
creative spark . . . . Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even
though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result
of copying.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (interim ed. 1991).
27. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Section 102(b)
states: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. §
102(b).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, ("by securing for limited Times").
29. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
30. Id. The statutory scheme can be broken down as follows:
General: copyright endures for the life of the author plus fifty years. Id. § 302(a).
Joint Works: copyright endures for the life of the last surviving author plus fifty years. Id. §
302(b).
Anonymous Works, Pseudonymous Works, and Works for Hire: copyright endures for seventy-five years from the first publication or for one hundred years from the date of creation,
whichever is shorter. Id. § 302(c).
31. Compare id. § 302 (copyright protection 50-100 years depending on subject matter)
with 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (patent protection lasting for seventeen years).
32. 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942). Morton Salt was the first Supreme Court decision to allow a
defendant to raise the patent misuse defense even though not a party to the patent owner's misuse.
J. Dianne Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357
(1990). "[T]he doctrine [of patent misuse] as it is used now-as an affirmative defense to infringement based on the patentee's inequitable conduct-was first stated in Morton Salt." Id. at
365. Prior Supreme Court decisions had allowed the defense to be raised only when the defendant
was a party to the misuse. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283
U.S. 27 (1931) (misuse defense allowed for a contributory infringer supplying unpatented items to
a licensee); Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (licensee/defendant was licensed patented product on the condition that he use unpatented materials
furnished by the patentee).
For a more in depth analysis of the patent misuse doctrine, see Brinson, supra, at 357; Robert
Published
by eCommons,
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"an extension of the . . . doctrine of 'unclean hands' to the patent
field."" 3 Patent misuse is based on a determination that one who uses a
patent to exceed the limited grant of the Patent Act 34 is not entitled to
the protection afforded by the patent grant.3 5 Procedurally, patent misuse is raised as an equitable defense during an infringement action. 36
In Morton Salt, the patent owner licensed its patented salt machine on the condition that the licensee agree to only use salt tablets
purchased from the patent owner. 7 The Court held that this use of the
patent exceeded the limited grant of the patent laws. 8 Relying solely
on the Patent Act, 39 the Supreme Court found that Morton Salt had
misused the patent by attempting to restrain competition. ° The Court
based its decision on the public policy underlying the patent process,
stating, "[t]he patentee, like . . . other holders of an exclusive privilege
granted in the furtherance of a public policy, may not claim protection
of his grant by the courts where it is being used to subvert that policy." 4 1 The Court found that Morton's practice of tying the use of its
patented process to the purchase of unpatented articles subverted public policy by exceeding the scope of the patent monopoly. 2
In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co."' (Mercoid I),
the Supreme Court reiterated the Morton Salt holding that the limits
of a patent are to be confined narrowly and strictly to the terms of the

Antitrust Analysis and the Doctrine of Patent Misuse: A Unification Under the Rule of Reason,
46 U. PirrT. L. REV. 209 (1984).
33. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1956) (patent
holder may bring an infringement action once the misuse is purged).
34. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
35. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 488.
36. Id. at 490-92. The defendant may raise the misuse defense in actions in law as well as in
actions of equity. William J.'
Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Actions, 9
UCLA L. REV. 76, 77 (1962). See generally CHISUM, supra note 11, § 19.04.
37. 314 U.S. at 490.
38. Id. at 491.
39. Id. at 490. The Court chose to rest the decision solely on the Patent Act and forego the
Clayton Act stating, "The question we must decide is not necessarily whether respondent has
violated the Clayton Act, but whether a court of equity will lend its aid to protect the patent
monopoly when respondent is using it as the effective means of restraining competition with its
sale of an unpatented article." Id.
40. Id. at 494.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 491. The Court stated:
A patent operates to create and grant to the patentee an exclusive right to make, use and
vend the particular device described and claimed in the patent. But a patent affords no
immunity for a monopoly not within the grant, . . . and the use of it to suppress competition in the sale of an unpatented article may deprive the patentee of the aid of a court of
equity to restrain an alleged infringement by one who is a competitor.
Id. (citations omitted).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
43. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
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patent grant.44 The license agreement employed in Mercoid I provided
that Mid-Continent's royalty payments were to be based on the sale of
an unpatented combustible stoker switch which was part of the patented heating system. 5 The Court stated that the fact that a patent
owner had the power to refuse a license did not enable the owner to
enlarge the monopoly by attaching conditions to its use."6 The Court
described the blanket license agreement used in Mercoid I as "a
graphic illustration of the evils of an expansion of the patent monopoly
by private engagements." 4' 7
In a companion case, Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co.48 (Mercoid II), the Supreme Court apparently shifted
the rationale underlying the patent misuse doctrine from patent policy
to antitrust policy. Mercoid II involved facts identical to those in Mercoid I except the patent owner sold the switches themselves and also
9
licensed others to sell the switches used in the patented machine. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that "[t]he legality of any
attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is
measured by the anti-trust laws not by the patent law." 5 The Supreme
Court has since retreated from the statements made in Mercoid II and
has made it clear that patent misuse need not constitute an antitrust
violation for the infringement defendant to raise the defense
successfully. 5
In recent years, however, the distinction between patent and antitrust principles, as set out in Morton Salt, has become blurred. The
same struggles which have confronted the Supreme Court with the de44. Id. at 665.
45. Id. at 663. In this case Mid-Continent brought a suit against Mercoid for contributory
infringement. Id. at 662. Mercoid denied the contributory infringement claim and alleged that
Mid-Continent was barred from relief because it was seeking to extend the grant of the patent to
unpatented devices. Id.
46. Id. at 666. The Court stated:
The necessities or convenience of the patentee do not justify any use of the monopoly of the
patent to create another monopoly. The fact that the patentee has the power to refuse a
license does not enable him to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by the expedient of
attaching conditions to its use . . . .The method by which the monopoly is sought to be
extended is immaterial.
Id. (citations omitted).
47. Id. The holding in Mercoid has since been altered by amendment to the Patent Act. See
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (construing title 35, section
271 (d) of the United States Code as exempting from the misuse doctrine a tie-in of an unpatented
non-staple item useful only in practicing the patentee's patented process). See generally CHIsuM,
supra note 11,§ 19.04[1].
48. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 684;see also Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
51. See Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 200-02; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Published
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velopment of the patent misuse doctrine have also created problems for
the lower courts. Several lower courts appear to have incorporated antitrust principles into the patent misuse doctrine. 2
In USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc.,5" Judge Posner, writing
for the Seventh Circuit, questioned the reasoning of Morton Salt and
the line of cases following that decision. 54 The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a patent owner misused its patent by including a differential royalty schedule in a license agreement. 5 Judge
Posner stated that the Morton Salt formulation of the misuse doctrine
"is too vague a formulation to be useful; taken seriously it would put
all patent rights.at hazard." ' In dicta, Judge Posner posited that the
patent misuse doctrine should be based on conduct that violates the
antitrust laws.57
The Federal Circuit has also considered the convergence of patent
and antitrust principles.58 In Windsurfing International,Inc. v. AMF,
Inc., 59 Windsurfing International alleged that the defendants had infringed its patent on a sailboard.6 0 Windsurfing had licensed eleven
licensees the right to use the patented technology but not the right to
use the patentee's trademarks."1 The district court found that the

52. See Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc. 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 905 (1986); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (suggesting
the use of antitrust principles to determine patent misuse), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
53. 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
54. Id. at 510.
55. Id. at 505.
56. Id. at 510.
57. Id. at 512. Judge Posner stated:
The [patent misuse] doctrine arose before there was any significant body of federal
antitrust law, and reached maturity long before that law (a product very largely of free
interpretation of unclear statutory language) attained its present broad scope. Since the
antitrust laws as currently interpreted reach every practice that could impair competition
substantially, it is not easy to define a separate role for a doctrine also designed to prevent
an anticompetitive practice-the abuse of a patent monopoly.
Id. at 511. Having stated that antitrust law would encompass all activity that fell within patent
misuse, Judge Posner continued:
If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what principles
shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and
it is rather late in the day to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights
of patent holders to debilitating uncertainty.
Id. at 512. Thus, applying antitrust principles, the court denied the misuse defense because the
plaintiff "made no effort to present evidence of actual or probable anticompetitive effect in a
relevant market." Id. at 513.
58. The Federal Circuit Court is vested with plenary appellate jurisdiction in patent cases.
28 U.S.C § 1295(a)(1) (1988).
59. 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986).
60. Id. at 997.
61. Id. at 1001. The trademarks involved in this case were: "WINDSURFER", "WINDhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
SURFING", and "WIND SURF". Id.
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trademarks had become generic.6" In addition, the court held that the
agreement had an " 'inhibiting effect on competition' beyond the scope
63
of the patent and that the provisions were unenforceable1 because
Windsurfing had earned fifteen percent of its revenue from sales of
items displaying the trademarks. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's finding of misuse, stating that the misuse defense could
only be upheld if the effect of the agreement restrained competition in
a relevant market. 64 Thus, the Federal Circuit in Windsurfing incorporated the antitrust rule of reason analysis into the patent misuse

doctrine. 5
Although the Federal Circuit has applied antitrust principles when
the misuse is not a tie-in, 6 it has simultaneously considered itself restrained by Supreme Court precedent when the alleged misuse involves
a tie-in.6 7 In Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffart, 68 the Federal Circuit affirmed
a lower court's ruling that the patentee's practice of making its patented process available only to those who purchased a machine that
performed the process constituted misuse.6 9 Recognizing that commentators and courts have questioned the rationale of the Supreme Court
decisions involving misuse, the court nevertheless considered itself

62. A generic name is not entitled to legal protection. See The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1051-1127 (1988). See generally EARL W. KINTER & JACK LAHR. AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW PRIMER 309 (1982).
63. Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. Fred Ostermann GMBH, 613 F. Supp. 933, 953 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (quoting Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 817, 821 (1987)), rev'd
sub. nor., Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
905 (1986).
64. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed Cir.), cert. denied,
477 U.S. 905 (1986). The court stated: "To sustain a misuse defense involving a licensing arrangement not held to have been per se anticompetitive by the Supreme Court, a factual determination must reveal that the overall effect of the license tends to restrain competition unlawfully in
an appropriately defined relevant market." Id. (footnote omitted).
Although not explicitly stating its use of antitrust analysis the court's concern with whether
"the overall effect of the license tends to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant market" represents antitrust rule of reason analysis. See infra note 164 (for a discussion of rule of reason analysis).
65. 782 F.2d at 1001-02.
66. See id. at 995. A tie-in arrangement is defined as "a contract [which] expressly requires
the purchaser of certain products to purchase other, less-desired products of the supplier as a
condition for buying the preferred product..." KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 62, at 115; see
e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1943) (use of patented machine conditioned on use of switch manufactured by patent owner); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488 (1942) (use of patented machine conditioned on use of patent owners salt tablets).
67. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (tying of patented process to unpatented machine considered patent misuse).
68.

Id.
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"bound . . .to adhere to existing Supreme Court guidance in the area
until otherwise directed by Congress or by the Supreme Court. ' 70
Despite criticism in recent years, the doctrine of patent misuse remains a viable tool in preventing the unlawful expansion of the patent
monopoly. 71 The decisions in Senza-Gel, Windsurfing Internationaland
USM, however, suggest that in cases involving claims of misuse in areas not within traditional misuse categories, antitrust analysis is appropriate to determine patent misuse.7
C.

The Copyright Misuse Doctrine

Co-mmentators have debated whether the doctrine of misuse applies to the area of copyright law.7 3 Much of this controversy exists
because the Supreme Court has never expressly addressed the issue. As
a result, the lower courts have divided on the issue of whether a defendant in an infringement action may raise copyright misuse as an
affirmative defense. 4

70. Id. at 665 n.5; see Windsurfing Int'l, 782 F.2d at 1001-02 n.9; USM Corp. v. SPS
Technologies, Inc. 694 F.2d 505, 510-14 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983);
Competition Policy and the Patent Misuse Doctrine, Remarks by Roger B. Andewelt, Chief, Intellectual Property Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Before the Bar Association
for the District of Columbia, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section, 25 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 604 at 41, 44-45 (Nov. 11, 1982). Congress has also addressed misuse
in the areas of traditional misuse; recently enacted legislation requires antitrust analysis when
determining patent misuse in a tie-in situation. See Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, §
201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), (5) (1988)); see infra note 243 and
accompanying text. (discussing this amendment).
71. See S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS ch.3 (4th ed.
1981).
72. See Windsurfing Int'l, 803 F.2d at 665 n.5; Senza-Gel, 782 F.2d at 1001-02; USM, 694
F.2d at 510-11.
Although receiving criticism in the lower courts, the Supreme Court's most recent encounter
with the patent misuse doctrine suggests approval of the Morton Salt rationale. In Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., the Supreme Court approved of the Morton Salt decision and
stated that the misuse doctrine embodies "the policy of free competition." 448 U.S. 176, 193, 221
(1980).
73. See Frank Gibbs, Copyright Misuse: Thirty Years Waiting for the Other Shoe, 23
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 31 (1977) (misuse defense should not incorporate antitrust principles); Timothy H. Fine, Misuse and Antitrust Defenses to Copyright Infringement Actions, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 315 (1965) (Morton Salt considerations are applicable in the context of the copyright grant); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.09.
74. Compare Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publishing, Inc.,
719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (antitrust misuse not a defense to copyright infringement
action), afl'd 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc. 663
F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan. 1987) (summary judgment granted plaintiff on copyright infringement and anti-trust violations do not constitute a defense to copyright infringement), afd without
opinion, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, I l IS. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991); Orth-O-Vision,
Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y 1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Grant's
Cabin, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 633 (E.D. Mo. 1979); United Artists Assoc., Inc. v. NWL
Corp., 198 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc. 187 F.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
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1. The Doctrine of Copyright Misuse in the Supreme Court
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly declared copyright misuse to be a defense in a copyright infringement actioo, its de7
cisions in United States v. Paramount Pictures" and United States v.
Loew's Inc.7 6 suggest the existence of a "copyright misuse" defense in
an antitrust action. In Paramount Pictures, the government claimed
that the defendant's practice of block-booking copyrighted films violated antitrust law." Relying on the development of the patent misuse
doctrine, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding of an
antitrust violation. The Court stated: "enlargement of the monopoly of
the copyright was condemned below in reliance on the principle which
forbids the owner of a patent to condition its use on the purchase or use
of patented or unpatented materials. ' 78 Thus, Paramount's practice of
conditioning the licensing of one film on the licensing of another was
79
misuse of copyright and constituted an antitrust violation.
The Supreme Court again dealt with the practice of block-booking
in United States v. Loew's Inc.8" In Loew's, the Court considered
whether the defendant's practice of block-booking motion picture films
81
constituted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The question
raised in Loew's was whether the restraint of competition presumption,

Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Buck v. Cecere, 45 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1942); Buck v. Newsreel, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 787 (D. Mass 1938) with United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855
F.2d 604, 611-12 (8th Cir. 1988) (misuse defense denied because plaintiffs actions did not add to
the monopoly of the copyright); Supermarket of Homes v. San Fernando Valley Bd., 786 F.2d
1400 (9th Cir. 1986) (misuse defense acknowledged but denied for lack of proof); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir.) (the court recognized the
misuse defense but found there had been no evidence of misuse), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859
(1982); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, 290 (10th Cir.
1974) ("assuming arguendo that an antitrust violation is a defense in a copyright infringement
action, the record made in the trial court simply does not support its findings and conclusions"),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975); K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1967) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (copyright misuse may be raised as an
affirmative defense not as a counterclaim); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 484 F. Supp.
357 (D. Del. 1980) (defendant's motion for summary judgment on allegation of misuse denied
because of existence of material facts as to whether licensing agreements could survive antitrust
analysis).
75. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
76. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
77. 334 U.S. at 140-41. Block-booking is a practice in which "licenses to exhibit one or a
group of motion pictures are granted on the condition that the licensee must contract to show
other motion pictures as well." KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 62, at 451.
78. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157.
79. See id. at 131.
80. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
81. Id. at 40; see also supra note 4 (containing pertinent language of Sherman Act section
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associated with patent tying cases, applied when the tying arrangement
involved copyrighted items in the television medium. 82 In holding that
it did, the Court stated that "[the requisite economic power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted . . . . This
principle grew out of a long line of patent cases which had eventuated
in the doctrine that a patentee who utilized tying arrangements would
be denied all relief against infringements of his patent."" a The Court
found that the policies underlying the patent misuse cases were applicable and appropriate in an antitrust action alleging copyright misuse. 84
The significance of ParamountPictures and Loew's lies not only in
the Supreme Court's implicit recognition of copyright misuse in an antitrust action, but also in the Court's use of the patent misuse cases to
determine the scope of the defense. 85 Moreover, the Loew's decision has
been cited by one commentator as suggesting a "tacit approval [by the
Court] of an analogy between patents and copyrights" ' with respect to
the issue of antitrust misuse as a defense to an infringement action.
2.

Development of the Doctrine of Misuse in the Lower Courts

One of the first cases to confront the issue of the availability of the
copyright misuse defense was M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen." Jensen
extended the Supreme Court's holding in Morton Salt8 8 to the area of
copyright law. 89 The Jensen court held that, based on the policies underlying the copyright grant, copyright misuse was a valid defense in
an infringement action.9"
In Jensen, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) brought an infringement action against several theaters alleging use of copyrighted music on motion picture soundtracks
without payment of royalty fees. 9 ' The issue presented was whether
ASCAP's practice of licensing only the recording rights in their works
to the motion picture industry constituted misuse. 92 By employing such
82. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 47-51.
83. Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 46.
85. See id.; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156-58 (1948).
86. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.09[A], at 13-146.
87. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed per curiarn sub. nom., M. Witmark
& Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
88. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488 (1942). See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing Morton Salt).
89. See Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at 850.
90. Id. at 846.
91. Id. at 844.
92. Id. The method and plan of licensing employed by ASCAP involved the pooling of
nearly 80% of all of the music recorded in the motion picture industry. Id. at 847. The court
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
stated that through such a practice the plaintiffs "by a refusal to license, or by the imposition of
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a licensing method, theater owners were forced to purchase a separate
performance license from ASCAP.9 3 The court concluded that ASCAP
unlawfully extended the scope of the copyright grant by connecting the
94
performance license to the recording license.
The next decision to address the copyright misuse doctrine was
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.9" The Second Circuit introduced antitrust analysis directly into the doctrine of copyright misuse. 96 In Alfred Bell, the plaintiff brought suit for infringement of eight
copyrighted mezzotint engravings.9 7 Bell had agreed with other members of a trade guild to set the price and restrict the output of their
engravings.

98

In refusing to hold the copyright unenforceable against the defendant, the court's analysis balanced copyright and antitrust considerations
and also examined the culpability of the parties:
We have here a conflict of policies: (a) that of preventing the piracy of
copyrighted matter and (b) that of enforcing the anti-trust laws. We
must balance the two, taking into account the comparative innocence or
guilt of the parties, the moral character of their respective acts, the extent of the harm to the public interest, the penalty inflicted on the plaintiff if we deny relief. 99
The court concluded that because the defendant's infringement was
clear, while the plaintiff's antitrust violation was marginal, the enforcement of copyright policy outweighed the enforcement of antitrust
considerations. 0 0
The decision in Alfred Bell marked a departure from the rationale
established in Morton Salt and Jensen. The Alfred Bell decision added
° Thus, a
antitrust analysis to the determination of copyright misuse.
court using the Alfred Bell balancing test must consider both the plaintiff's anti-competitive behavior as well as the defendant's culpability

an exorbitant performance license fee, [could] sound the death knell of every motion picture theater in America." Id.
93. Id. at 845. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusive rights
that are conferred by the Copyright Act).
94. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at 847.
95. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
96. Id. at 106.
97. Id. at 99. A mezzotint engraving is "a method of engraving on a copper or steel plate by
scraping or polishing parts of a roughened surface so that an impression of light and shade can be

produced."
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before finding a misuse of copyright.1" 2 In practice, the plaintiff usually
prevails in cases using the Alfred Bell test.103
3. Recent Supreme Court Developments Regarding the Doctrine of
Misuse
Although it did not reach the issue, the Supreme Court's decision
in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.104
(CBS) also supports the existence of a copyright misuse defense.' 0 5 In
Broadcast Music, CBS brought an action claiming that the blanket
licensing practices employed by Broadcast Music, Inc. constituted an
unlawful tying arrangement and a misuse of copyright. 0 6 After the district court determined that the blanket license ar'gieements did not violate the antitrust laws, the Second Circuit reversed.' 0 7 The Second Circuit found the blanket license-to be a form of per se price fixing under
the Sherman Act' 0 8 and in a footnote stated that the blanket licensing
also amounted to a misuse of copyright.' 0 9 The Supreme Court implicitly recognized the existence of a copyright misuse defense when it reversed the Second Circuit's finding of per se price fixing "and the copyright misuse judgment dependent upon it." '
Even though this

102. Id. This represents a departure from traditional patent misuse analysis which does not
require an examination of the defendant's conduct nor conduct on the part of the plaintiff that
violates antitrust law. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
103. This is because in most cases the infringement by the defendant is so blatant and
obvious that it cannot be overlooked. See e.g., Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc. 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975). See generally
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, § 9.6.1, at 181-82.
104. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
105. See id. at 7. The Court failed to reach the finding of copyright misuse because it
disagreed with the Court of Appeals findings with respect to the per se illegality of the blanket
license agreement. Id. See infra note 164 (discussing the per se analysis associated with antitrust
analysis).
106. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d. Cir. 1977), rev'd sub norn.,
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
107. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom., Broadcasting Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
108. See supra note 4 (pertinent language of Sherman Act section 1).
109. Broadcast Music, 562 F.2d at 141 n.29. The Second Circuit stated:
As noted, CBS also claims violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. We need not go into
the legal arguments on this point because they are grounded on its factual claim that there
are barriers to direct licensing and "bypass" of the ASCAP blanket license. The District
Court, as noted, rejected this contention and its findings are not clearly erroneous. The § 2
claim must therefore fail at this time and on this record.
We dispose of CBS' claim of copyright misuse in the same manner and for essentially
the same reasons as the § I claim.
Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
110. Broadcasting Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979).
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reference occurred in the context of a reverse and remand, the Supreme Court apparently accepted the Second Circuit's finding of copyright misuse based on an antitrust violation."'
The Supreme Court's failure to directly address the issue of copyright misuse has created much confusion and the lower courts remain
divided on whether such a doctrine exists." 2 Relying on the Supreme
Court cases, courts have ruled both explicitly and implicitly that such a
doctrine may exist." 3 In many of the decisions, the copyright misuse
defense appears in large part as an allegation that the copyright owner
in some way has violated the antitrust laws." 4 These decisions leave
unclear the question whether the courts are abiding by the Morton Salt
public policy rationale and assuming that an antitrust violation is also a
violation of copyright policy, or are creating a misuse defense based on
substantive antitrust law standards. The Lasercomb decision, however,
makes it clear that in the Fourth Circuit, the public policy rationale of
Morton Salt governs when deciding if a misuse exists." 5

11l.Id.
112. See cases cited supra note 74.
113. See, e.g., United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 611-12 (8th Cir.
1988) (misuse defense denied because plaintiff's actions did not add to the monopoly of the copyright); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975). "[A]ssuming arguendo that an antitrust violation is a
defense in a copyright infringement action, the record made in the trial court simply does not
support its findings and conclusions." Marks Music, 497 F.2d at 290; see also F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir.) (the court recognized the
misuse defense but found there had been no evidence of misuse), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859
(1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 357 (D. Del. 1980) (defendant's
motion for summary judgment on allegation of misuse denied because of existence of material
facts as to whether licensing agreements could survive antitrust analysis). It is important to note
that the defendants were denied use of the misuse defense for failure to meet the burden of establishing all of the elements required, not because the courts felt that the misuse defense did not
exist.
114. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs., 746 F.
Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (counterclaim of copyright misuse and antitrust violation); Bellsouth
Advertising & Publishing v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, 719 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (affirmative defense of copyright misuse based on violation of antitrust laws), afd, 933 F.2d 952
(11th Cir. 1991); F.E.L. Publications, 506 F. Supp. at 1127 (per se illegal tying arrangement
basis for misuse finding); Moor-Law, 484 F. Supp. at 357 (summary judgment as to copyright
misuse and antitrust violations denied because of existence of material factual issues); Orth-OVision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (misuse defense denied
against counterclaim of infringement in suit alleging antitrust violation).
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FACTS AND HOLDING

The Facts of Lasercomb

In Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,"' the plaintiff,
Lasercomb America, Inc. (Lasercomb), brought suit against Larry
Holliday, president and sole shareholder of Holiday Steel Rule Die
Corporation (Holiday Steel),' 1 7 and Job Reynolds, a computer
programmer for Holiday Steel, alleging copyright infringement and
fraud." 8 The case came before the Fourth Circuit on the defendants'
appeal of a district court judgment holding the defendants liable for
copyright infringement and fraud based on the defendants' unauthorized copying and marketing of Lasercomb's software." 9
The controversy arose over a software program created by
Lasercomb called Interact. 20 Interact is a CAD/CAM12 1 program
which allows a designer to create a template duplicating a cardboard
cutout on a computer screen; the software then uses the template to
create a matching steel die. 22 Prior to the market release of Interact,
Lasercomb licensed four copies of the software to Holiday Steel, which
paid $35,000 for the first copy, $17,500 each for the second and third
copies, and $2,000 for the fourth copy.' 2 3 Lasercomb informed Holiday
Steel that additional copies of the program could be purchased for
$2,000 each. 24 The license agreement included language purporting to
prohibit any licensee from developing a similar program.1 25 The license
agreement stated:
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it will not
permit or suffer its directors, officers and employees, directly or indirectly, to write, develop, produce or sell computer assisted die making
software.
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1)
year after the termination of this Agreement, that it will not write, develop, produce, or sell or assist others in the writing, developing, producing or selling computer assisted die making software, directly or indirectly without Lasercomb's prior written consent. Any such activity
116. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
117. Holiday Steel was a defendant in the District Court decision but went bankrupt and
was not a party in the appeal taken to the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 971 n.L
118. Id.at 971.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The software is called CAD/CAM which stands for "computer assisted design and
computer assisted manufacture." Id. at 971 n.2.
122. Id. at 971.
123. Id.
124. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
125. Id. at 973.
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undertaken without Lasercomb's written consent shall nullify any warranties or agreements of Lasercomb set forth herein.12
The term of the license agreement was ninety-nine years.127 Holiday
Steel, however, was not bound by this license agreement.12 8 Lasercomb
sent the agreement to Holiday with a request that Larry Holliday sign.
and return it, but he never signed the agreement. 2 9 Apparently,
Lasercomb overlooked the fact that Holliday did not return the
agreement." °
Instead of purchasing additional copies from Lasercomb, Holiday
Steel circumvented the protective devices that Lasercomb had employed with the software and made three unauthorized copies of the
program.1 31 In addition, Larry Holliday directed Job Reynolds to create a software program called " 'PDS-1000,' which was almost entirely
of Lasercomb's program, and to market it as its own
a direct copy"
2
1
software.
Upon discovery of Holiday Steel's activities, Lasercomb registered
its copyright in Interact and filed suit against Holiday Steel alleging
copyright infringement, breach of contract, misappropriation of trade
1 33
secret, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and fraud.
There was no question that the "defendants engaged in unauthorized
copying, and the purposefulness of their unlawful action [was apparent] from their deceptive practices."' 3 4 The defendants asserted the affirmative defenses of copyright misuse and lack of statutory copyright
35
notice.1
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina rejected the copyright misuse defense for three reasons. First,
the court noted that Holiday Steel had not explicitly agreed to the contract clauses alleged to constitute misuse.' 36 Second, the court found
the clause to be a reasonable restriction in light of the nature of com-

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. id.
131. Id. at 971.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 972. The Fourth Circuit's decision that the licensing agreement constituted
copyright misuse may have an effect on the area of trade secret law. Language similar to that
used in Lasercomb's licensing agreement often is used to protect trade secrets. However, the impact of this decision on the ability to protect trade secrets is beyond the scope of this article. See
generally KINTER & LAHR, supra note 62, at 129 (providing an introductory explanation of the
area of trade secret law).
134. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 971.
135. Id. at 972.
Published
eCommons,
1991
at 973.
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puter software. 13 7 Third, the court questioned whether such a copyright
38
misuse-defense existed.1
The district court held for Lasercomb on the claims of copyright
infringement, breach of contract and fraud' 39 and awarded actual damages in the amount of $105,000 for infringement and fraud.' 4 0 The defendants appealed. 4
B.

The Fourth Circuit's Rationale

Judge Sprouse, writing for the Fourth Circuit, began his analysis
by stating that "a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in the law of
copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent
law." 4 2 Although the court recognized that "much uncertainty engulfs
the 'misuse of copyright' defense,"'"" Judge Sprouse based his conclusion on parallels in the development of and policies behind patent and
copyright law in England and the United States. 44

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 972-73. The district court based its finding of breach of contract, which the
defendants did not appeal, on a letter in which Holliday admitted an oral agreement between
Holiday Steel and Lasercomb was binding. Id. at 973 n.7. Lasercomb's claims of misappropriation
of trade secret, false designation of origin, and unfair competition were dismissed by the district
court as being preempted by the Copyright Act. Id. at 972. Preemption of state claims is governed
by title 17, section 301 of the United States Code which states:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or
after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C § 301(a) (1988).
For cases that have addressed the issue of preemption see Videotronics Inc. v. Bend Elecs.,
564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983) (Copyright Act preempts state trade secret, common law
misappropriation and protection of programs); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (federal copyright policy preempts common law misappropriation). But see Warrington Assoc., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367
(N.D. II1. 1981) (trade secret protection not preempted by copyright claim). See generally GOLDsTEIN, supra note 3, § 15.9 (discussing preemption of state laws by the Copyright
Act).
140. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 972. The district court found that Lasercomb had been damaged in the amount of $105,000 on the copyright infringement claim, and damaged in the amount
of $105,000 on the fraud claim. Id. at 972 n.3. However, the court held that because these two
amounts arose from lost sales of the same the three Interact copies, Lasercomb could only recover
once. Id.
141. Id. at 972.
142. Id. at 973.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 974-75. The Court stated:
[Tihe similarity of the policies underlying patent and copyright is great and historically
has been consistently recognized. Both patent law and copyright law seek to increase this
store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding inventors and authors with the exclusive
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
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The court first analyzed the underlying rationale of patent and
copyright law.1" 5 The court traced the development of both patent and
copyright law during the sixteenth century in England.1" 6 Judge
Sprouse stated that "the English statutory treatment of copyright [law]
was similar to that of patent in that it granted the creator a monopoly
for a limited time only. 1 4 7
The court continued its analysis of the similarities of copyright
and patent law by looking next to the Constitution of the United
States. 1 8 The court stated that "[i]n giving Congress the power to create copyright and patent laws, the framers combined the two concepts
in one clause, stating a unitary purpose-to promote progress. 1 49 The
court also focused on the Supreme Court's comments in Mazer v.
Stein concerning the public policy served by copyright and patent.1 5'
The court concluded that the philosophy of copyright paralleled that of
patent in that it provided incentives for the introduction of new ideas
into the public domain by granting authors exclusive rights in their
works for a limited time. 5 2

rights to their works for a limited time. At the same time, the granted monopoly power
does not extend to property not covered by the patent or copyright. . . . Thus, we are
persuaded that the rationale of Morton Salt in establishing the misuse defense applies to
copyrights.
Id. at 976-77 (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 974.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 975.
148. Id. The Court specifically examined Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution which states: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Author and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8).
149. Id. Judge Sprouse also relied on a comment by James Madison in The Federalist for
support that the public policy behind copyright and patent is essentially the same:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has
been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful
inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941)).
ISO. 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953) (plaintiff's use of copyrighted statuettes as mass manufactured lamp bases not a misuse of copyright).
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975. The Fourth Circuit quoted Mazer v. Stein, in which the
151.
Supreme Court stated:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyright is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by-personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science
and useful Arts". Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953).
911 1991
F.2d at 975.
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Having concluded that copyright and patent serve parallel public
policies, the court next considered the patent misuse doctrine. 153 The
court focused primarily on the foundational patent misuse case of Mor5
ton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger5'
Judge Sprouse also recognized that
both the courts and the legislature have accepted the patent misuse
doctrine as a defense to an infringement action.1 55 Relying on the policy arguments set forth in Morton Salt, 56 Judge Sprouse stated that
similar policies justified the existence of a misuse doctrine in the copy57
right area.'
The Lasercomb court next looked to the development of a similar
misuse doctrine in the copyright area.' 58 Acknowledging the uncertainty of whether such a defense existed, the court recognized that

153. Id.
154. 314'U.S. 488 (1942). In Morton Salt, the Supreme Court held that Morton's licensing
practice was an unlawful extension of the patent monopoly and established the misuse doctrine as
an equitable defense to an infringement action. Id. The Court stated "[i]t is a principle of general
application that courts, and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid
where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public interest." Id. at 492; see also
supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
155. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. As support for this statement the court cited three authors: HOLMES, supra note 3, § 1.07; 8 ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB, LIPscoMB's WALKER ON PATENTS §§
28:32-28:36 (3d ed. 1989); Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse
Reform Act and Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38
DRAKE L. REV. 175 (1989). Id. Further, the court cited the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), (5)). Id. Although
recognizing the impact of the Patent Reform Act in a footnote: "[lt]he primary effect of the Patent
Misuse Reform Act is to eliminate the presumption that use of a patent license to create a tie-in is
per se misuse[,]" the court failed to recognize the statute's incorporation of antitrust analysis into
the doctrine of patent misuse. Id. 976 n.15; see also infra note 243 (discussing the impact of the
1988 Patent Reform Act on the patent misuse doctrine).
156. Concerning the public policy underlying the Patent Act, the Supreme Court in Morton
Salt stated:
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent monopoly carries out a
public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the
exclusive Right . . ." to their "new and useful" inventions ....
[T]he public policy which
includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced
in the invention. It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or
limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy
to grant.
It is a principle of general application that courts, and especially courts of equity, may
appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to
the public interest.
314 U.S. at 492 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8); see supra notes 32-42 (discussion of
Morton Salt).
157. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. Judge Sprouse stated: "We are of the view, however, that
since copyright and patent law serve parallel public interests, a 'misuse' defense should apply to
infingement actions brought to vindicate either right." Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
158. Id.
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other courts were split on the issue. 159 Further, only one case, a district
court opinion, had actually applied copyright misuse as a bar to an

infringement action. 160 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that "since
copyright and patent law serve parallel public interests, a 'misuse' defense should apply to infringement actions to vindicate either right."1 6
Relying on the direct correlation between the policies underlying
patent and copyright, the court applied the patent misuse doctrine as
stated in Morton Salt to the facts before it.162 The district court had
found Lasercomb's anticompetitive clause reasonable in light of the
' 3 Judge Sprouse, how"'delicate and sensitive' nature of software." 16
ever, concluded that while the district court's reliance on the "rule of
reason"1 64 concept of antitrust law was understandable, it was

159. Id.
160. Id. The other decision recognizing copyright misuse was M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed per curiam sub. nom., M. Whitmark &
Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949); see supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
161. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
162. Id. at 977-78. In fact the Fourth Circuit quoted a passage from Morton Salt merely
replacing the words "inventor", "patent" and "new and useful" with "author", "copyright" and
"original work's", respectively:
The grant of the [author] of the special privilege of a [copyright] carries out a public
policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to [Authors] . . .the exclusive
Right..." to their ["original" works] . . .But the public policy which includes [original
works] within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the [original expression]. It equally forbids the use of the [copyright] to secure an exclusive right or
limited monopoly not granted by the [Copyright] Office and which it is contrary to public
policy to grant.
Id. at 977 (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942)) (alterations
in the original).
163.
Id. at 977.
164. The Supreme Court formulated the rule of reason analysis in Chicago Board of Trade
v. United States. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
A court may also use a per se analysis to determine if an antitrust violation exists. The
Supreme Court first enunciated the per se standard in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.
310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). A more succinct definition comes from Northern Pacific Railway v.
United States:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
excuse for their
the business
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"

The Fourth Circuit recognized that patents and copyrights are exceptions to the general public policy against restraints of trade.1 66
"Since antitrust law is the statutory embodiment of that public policy,"

the court found the frequent association of antitrust law with the misuse defense to be understandable.1 67 Judge Sprouse, however, again relying on Morton Salt, stated that "flt]he question is not whether the
copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law ... , but
whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public
policy embodied in the grant of a copyright." 68 The court acknowledged that an antitrust violation might give rise to a misuse defense,
but held that "the converse is not necessarily true-a misuse need not

the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit
of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as
related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken. Among the practices
which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price
fixing, . . . division of markets, . . . group boycotts, ...
and tying arrangements.
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (citations omitted).
There are three reasons for allowing a presumption of illegality in antitrust cases. First, the
rule provides guidance for planners of new transactions by delineating those transactions which
are not allowed under the Sherman Act. See William J. Borner, Note, Motion Picture Split
Agreements: An Antitrust Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 159, 161 n.7 (1983) (arguing that
motion picture split agreements are a per se violation of the Sherman Act). Second, it reduces the
need for an extended and difficult investigation into the unreasonableness of a particular restraint.
Id. Finally, it allows the judge to avoid resolution of "technical and complex issues which are
beyond" his capabilities. Id.
165. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977, 977 n.17.
166. Id. at 977.
167. Id. The court attributed this reliance on the intermingling of antitrust and misuse
defenses. Commenting on the source of this confusion Judge Sprouse stated:
In the context of copyright, this confusion probably arises at least in part from Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS . . . . In that case, CBS brought an antitrust suit and also asked
for a declaratory judgment that the defendant's action constituted misuse of copyright. The
Second Circuit first addressed whether there was an antitrust violation, and finding there
was, "the Court of Appeals held that the challenged conduct constituted misuse of copyrights solely on the basis of its finding of unlawful price fixing." . . . The Supreme Court
reversed the finding of a Sherman Act violation-on the basis that the court of appeals had
used the wrong standard to evaluate the price fixing-stating: "We reverse that judgment,
and the copyright misuse judgment dependent upon it ...
. . Standing alone, this
latter sentence seems to imply that copyright misuse depends on a finding of an antitrust
violation. In context, however, it is apparent that misuse was linked to antitrust in that case
simply as a matter of litigation strategy. Copyright misuse was not asserted as a defense to
an infringement suit, and the primary claim was an antitrust claim.
Id. at 977 n.17 (citations omitted) (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 6 n.9, 24 (1979)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
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be a violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense
to an infringement action."' 9
Having established the test for determining copyright misuse,
Judge Sprouse focused his attention on the anticompetitive clause contained in Lasercomb's license agreement. 70 Although recognizing that
Lasercomb had the right to protect its software, Judge Sprouse stated
that the agreement went much further and "essentially attempt[ed] to
suppress any attempt by the licensee to independently implement the
idea which Interact expresses."'' The court found this to be a direct
violation of section 102(b) of title 17 of the United States Code, which
states: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea."' 7 2 The court deemed it irrelevant that
the anticompetitive language was negotiable and that at least one licensee had successfully negotiated out of the non-competition provisions.'
The court expressed particular concern that the license agreement
attempted to force a licensee "to forego utilization of the creative abilities of all its officers, directors and employees . . ."I" and that "these
creative abilities are withdrawn from the public"'15 for a period of
ninety-nine years, which could be longer than the life of the copyright
itself. ' The court compared the language contained in this agreement
to patent misuse 177 language found in Compton v. Metal Products,
7
Inc.1 8
In Compton, the license agreement included a provision that
Compton would not engage in any activity relating to the manufacture
or sale of equipment of the type licensed for as long as royalties were
due under the patent.' 79 On appeal from the district court's finding of
patent infringement, the Fourth Circuit held that "the total withdrawal
of Compton from the mining machine manufacturing business . . . for

169. Id. The Supreme Court in Morton Salt held:
It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has violated the Clayton Act, for we
conclude that in any event the maintenance of the present suit to restrain petitioner's manufacture or sale of the alleged infringing machines is contrary to public policy and that the
district court rightly dismissed the complaint for want of equity.
314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942).
170. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978-79; see supra text accompanying note 126 (the language
of the license agreement).
171. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
172. 17 U.S'C. § 102(b) (1988); see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
173. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. For a discussion of the duration of a copyright see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
177. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
178. 453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1971).
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a period of 20 years unreasonably lessens the competition which the
public has a right to expect, and constitutes misuse of patents."18
Relying on the holding in Compton, Judge Sprouse then examined
the language employed by Lasercomb and found it to be "at least as
egregious as that which led us to bar the infringement action in
Compton, and therefore amounts to misuse of its copyright."' 181 The
court stated the "misuse arises from Lasercomb's attempt to use its
copyright in a particular expression, . . . to control competition in an
area outside the copyright, i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die manufacture, regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an antitrust
violation."1 8
The final issue addressed by the Fourth Circuit was the district
court's finding that the misuse defense was not applicable unless the
defendant was a party to the licensing agreement. 's3 Relying again on
Morton Salt's holding, Judge Sprouse found the copyright misuse defense "available even if the defendants themselves have not been injured by the misuse.' 84 In both Morton Salt and Compton, the infringement suits were barred on public policy grounds even though the
defendants were not parties to the license agreements. 85 Judge Sprouse
concluded that since patent and copyright serve the same policy, the
scope of the copyright misuse doctrine should be the same as the patent
misuse doctrine.' 8 6 Therefore, because the patent misuse doctrine has
no requirement that the defendant be a party to the agreement, the
copyright misuse doctrine need not have such a requirement. 8 7 Holding that Lasercomb should have been barred by the defense of copyright misuse from asserting infringement, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the injunction and the award of damages for copyright infringement. 188

180. Id. at 45.
181. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942). "It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit, in conjunction with the
patentee's course of conduct, which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of whether the
particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent." Id.; see also Compton v. Metal
Prod., Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 44 (4th Cir. 1971).
186. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
187. Id. Judge Sprouse stated, "the fact that [defendants] here were not parties to one of
Lasercomb's standard license agreements is inapposite to their copyright misuse defense." Id.
188.
Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of fraud and remanded the
case for a determination of what amount Holiday Steel would have paid for the three copies of
Interact, apart from fraud. Id. at 980-81. In addition, the court stated "[tihis holding, of course,
is not an invalidation of Lasercomb's copyright. Lasercomb is free to bring suit for infringement
once it has purged itself of the misuse." Id. at 979 n.22. Several courts have accepted the holding
of Lasercomb. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
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IV.

ANALYSIS

The Fourth Circuit's decision in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds 18 9 marks a return to the rationale established1 9" in Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. 9 ' The Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb became
the first appellate court to apply the doctrine of copyright misuse as a
defense in a copyright infringement action.192 The court was persuaded
that "a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in the law of copyright
just as a misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent law." 1 93 However, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the rationale underlying the patent misuse cases and the removal of antitrust analysis from the determination of copyright misuse is misplaced.1 94 Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit's holding results in a broad and unworkable doctrine of copyright misuse.
When defining the doctrine of misuse, as applicable to copyright
law, Judge Sprouse relied extensively on the doctrine of patent misuse19 6 as enunciated in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.196 Judge
Sprouse's reliance on Morton Salt is flawed for two reasons. First, the
doctrine of patent misuse established in Morton Salt is nearly fifty
years old and the lower courts have recently questioned the application
of the principles of Morton Salt.19 7 Second, Judge Sprouse's compari-'
son of the policies surrounding copyright and patent law neglected to
examine either the Copyright or Patent Act. In doing so, Judge
Sprouse overlooked the fundamental difference that each has on the
competitive marketplace.
A. Recent Questions Surrounding the Status of the Patent Misuse
Doctrine
The doctrine of patent misuse established in Morton Salt is nearly
fifty years old and' recently several lower courts have questioned the
application of the principles of Morton Salt.' 98 Judge Sprouse's analy-

1991) (recognizing validity of copyright misuse as a defense to infringement but finding it unsupported on the facts); Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (motion for
summary judgment denied because copyright misuse is an available defense).
189. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
190. See id. at 975-77.
191. 314 U.S. 488 (1942); see supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing Morton Salt).
192. Cooper, supra note 10, at 6, col. 3.
193. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 238-242.
195. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975.
196. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
197. See infra note 198 (discussing cases questioning principles of Morton Salt).
198. See e.g., Windsurfing Int'l. Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
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sis failed to consider these cases and their impact on the current doctrine of patent misuse.199 These cases suggest a drawing back of the
patent misuse doctrine from a strict per se analysis to a rule of reason
analysis.2 0 0 Moreover, they urge the incorporation of antitrust principles into the doctrine of misuse."' The effect of these decisions has
been to limit application of the principles of Morton Salt to factually
similar situations. 2
Morton Salt and Lasercomb are factually dissimilar. In Morton
Salt, the Supreme Court based its finding of misuse on the tying of a
patented item to an unpatented item. 03 The Supreme Court held that
such conduct constituted an illegal extension of the patent grant.20 4 Arguably, the decisions in United States v. Paramount Pictures,20 5 United
States v. Loew's Inc. 20 ' and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc.207 (CBS) support the proposition that a copyright
holder who attempts to expand the copyright monopoly by tying an
uncopyrighted work to the licensing of a copyrighted work misuses her
copyright.20 1 In Lasercomb, however, there was no such tying

censing practice per se anticompetitive." Id. at 1001-02 n.9; see also USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983). Morton Salt public
policy rationale "is too vague a formulation to be useful; taken seriously it would put all patent
rights at hazard." USM, 694 F.2d at 510; see also supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text
(discussing these cases).
199. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975-76.
200. See supra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 665 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (patent misuse found when patentee tied unpatented machine to license of patented process). See supra notes
67-70 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
203. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491.
204. Id.
205. 334 U.S. 131 (1948); see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing this
case).
206. 371 U.S. 38 (1962); see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing this
case).
207. 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see supra notes 104-111 and accompanying text (discussing this
case).
208. See Loew's, 371 U.S. at 38. The Supreme Court stated:
It is therefore clear that the tying arrangements here both by their "inherent nature"
and by their "effect" injuriously restrain trade.... Accommodation between the statutorily dispensed monopoly in the combination of contents in the patented or copyrighted
product and the statutory principles of free competition demands that extension of the
patent or copyright monopoly by the use of tying agreements be strictly confined.
Id. at 49 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court also addressed tying agreements in the copyright context in Paramount
Pictures:
Where a high quality film greatly desired is licensed only if an inferior one is taken, the
latter borrows quality from the former and strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the
other. The practice tends to equalize rather than differentiate the reward for the individual
copyrights. Even where all films included in the package are of equal quality, the requirehttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
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arrangement." 9
In Lasercomb, the Fourth Circuit based its finding of misuse on an
anti-competition clause in Lasercomb's license agreement.2 10 Under

current application of the patent misuse doctrine, an anti-competition
clause, such as that used in Lasercomb, is scrutinized using antitrust
analysis.2" The use of such a clause would not constitute misuse without a finding of dominance in a relevant market.2" 2 By failing to consider Lasercomb's dominance in the relevant market before finding
copyright misuse, Judge Sprouse misused the misuse doctrine.2"' Thus,
his dismissal of antitrust analysis is inappropriate in light of the current
trend in patent misuse cases of requiring antitrust analysis as part of a
finding of patent.misuse.
B.

Flawed Reliance on Public Policy

Judge Sprouse's reliance on the public policy rationale of Morton
Salt is also flawed. In reaching the conclusion that the doctrine of misuse applied to copyright, Judge Sprouse drew parallels between the
public policy that underlies both copyright and patent law. 1 By failing
to consider the Copyright Act2" 5 and the Patent Act, 216 Judge Sprouse
did not recognize the fundamental difference the two grants have on
the ability of the holder to control the marketplace.2 17 This fundamen-

ment that all be taken if one is desired increases the market for some. Each stands not on
its own footing but in whole or in part on the appeal which another film may have. As the
District Court said, the result is to add to the monopoly of the copyright in violation of the
principle of the patent cases involving tying clauses.
334 U.S. at 158.
209. 911 F.2d at 972-73 n.6. The Fourth Circuit stated:
This simply is not a tie-in. No customer is required to buy steel rule dies in order to be able
to purchase the Interact software, nor must any customer buy the Interact software in
order to purchase steel rule dies, nor does Lasercomb require customers to agree to not
purchase any other vendor's wares in order to be able to purchase Lasercomb's software
and dies.
id.
210. Id. at 978-79; see supra text accompanying note 126 (applicable text of the
agreement).
211. See Windsurfing Int'l., Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510-12 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
212. See Windsurfing nO7., 782 F.2d at 1001-02; USM, 694 F.2d at 510-12.
213. See Windsurfing Intl, 782 F.2d at 1001-02. "[Al factual determination must reveal
that the overall effect of the license tends to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately
defined relevant market." Id.
214. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 974-75.
215. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1988).
216. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1988).
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tal difference further strengthens the need to apply antitrust principles

when determining if misuse exists in the copyright context.
While the law of patent and copyright seem very similar, they
have important differences. The concepts originate from the same
clause of the Constitution, but copyright law and patent law take different approaches to the goal of promoting the "Progress of Science
and Useful Arts."2' 18 Copyright only protects against direct copying of
the copyrighted material; it provides no protection against independent
discovery.2 19 Copyright protection extends only to the expression of the
idea, not to the idea itself. 220 Conversely, the rights afforded by a patent are much broader and stricter than copyright.2 21 A patent protects
against independent development, copying, and use without providing
any of the exceptions found in the copyright law.2 22 The court in
Lasercomb failed to recognize this fundamental difference and, consequently, misapplied the misuse doctrine.2 23
The difference between the two grants significantly impacts how
each affects the marketplace. A patent provides the patentee with the
power to exclude others from the market. 224 This power effectively
gives the patent holder control of the market for a significant period of
time. 225 Due to the patentee's ability to exclude others from the market, courts have expressed concern that a patentee might use this market power to expand the limited monopoly. 22 6 Prevention of this type of

218. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl.8.
219. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) with 35 U.S.C § 154 (1988).
220. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see supra note 27 (language of this statute).
221. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) with 35 U.S.C § 154 (1988).
222. See 35 U.S.C §§ 102, 271(a) (1988).
223. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 974-75.
224. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 57 (1918). The Supreme
Court stated: "Of course, there is restraint in a patent. Its strength is in the restraint, the right to
exclude others from the use of the invention, absolutely or on the terms the patentee chooses to
impose. This strength is the compensation which the law grants for the exercise of invention." Id.
225. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). A patent provides the patentee with the exclusive right to that
patent for a period of seventeen years. Id.
226. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). "The requisite economic power
is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted." Id. at 45; see also Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). "The patents on their face conferred
monopolistic, albeit lawful, market control .... " Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 608-09; accord
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
However, recent court decisions have questioned the proposition that patents confer significant market control. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1983)
("a patent holder has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the
patented product"); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1016 (1982)(few antitrust problems arise, if the patented product is one of many that compete in the marketplace). See generally Brinson, supra note 32, at 399 ("it is generally recognized
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
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conduct fostered the creation of the patent misuse doctrine.22

Although similar to a patent in that a limited monopoly is granted,
a copyright does not command the same type of control over the market as does a patent.2 28 Unlike patent, the policy behind copyright is to
promote a variety of expressions of ideas. 22 9 As a result, copyright
works often have many substitutes. a Presumably, a person seeking a

that a patent is not a market-wide monopoly-a patent does not protect the patentee from having
to compete with producers of functionally-equivalent products."); William Montgomery, Note,
The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140 (1985).
227. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton
Salt, 314 U.S. at 488.
228. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumble Seat Press, Inc. 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.
1987). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
[A copyright] forbids copying the copyrighted work without the copyright holder's permission, but it does not forbid the making of close substitutes.
The danger of monopoly is more acutely posed by patent than by copyrights ....
A patent empowers its owner to prevent anyone else from making or using his
invention; a copyright just empowers its owner to prevent others from copying the particular verbal or pictorial or aural pattern in which he chooses to express himself. The economic power conferred is much smaller.
Id. at 1198-1201; see also Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47
U. Pirr. L. REV. 1119 (1986).
Courts have been notably less willing to allow the misuse defense in copyright infringement cases where defendant claims that the copyright proprietor has sought to extend
his copyright beyond its proper scope, and have looked to antitrust law as the sole regulator
of anticompetitive conduct. Presumably, this position rests on an appreciation that works of
literature, art and music are highly substitutable and that, in the usual case, copyright will
not confer the degree of market power that the patent-misuse cases presuppose.
Goldstein, supra, at 1128 (footnote omitted).
229. Goldstein, supra note 228, at 1122-23. Professor Goldstein commenting on the difference between patent and copyright has stated:
Although the framers, and subsequently Congress and the courts, recognized that
copyright and patent are instruments for intellectual and technological progress, they also
took care to discriminate between the objects of these two instruments, and to shape each
law to serve its special objects. Congress and the courts have recognized from the beginning
that society's interests in the arts are best served by the widest possible differentiation
among artistic works. The method of art, after all, is to refract the individual author's
unique viewpoint in language, line or music. We are thus better off with hundreds of different novels, paintings and musical compositions, each distilling the individual author's perception of reality, than we are with a single view of that reality. By contrast, the ends of
science and technology are impersonal. Society's interest in technological advance, although also served by differentiation, needs fewer resources devoted to variations on a single technological solution, and more to verifiable improvements on that solution.
Id.
230. See Richard Stitt, Comment, Copyright Self-Help Protection as Copyright Misuse:
Finally, The Other Shoe Drops, 57 UMKC L. REV. 899 (1989). The author states:
The subject matter of copyright is, with respect to consumer demand, highly substitutable and based upon individual sales. At any one time several products are available which
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eCommons,
1991
demand for entertainment or information. This substitutability rethe market
willbysatisfy

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 17:2

work on a particular idea will often have several options from which to
choose. Thus, because of the availability of substitutes, it is'difficult for
a single copyrighted work to gain market control. This failure to command market control has led courts to refuse to recognize the existence
of a copyright misuse defense.2" 1
In addition, the availability of substitutes in the marketplace acts
to prevent misuse. The buyer is free to pick and choose from several
available alternatives to acquire the best possible terms. 32 Thus, competition inherent in the market acts as a check against misuse. 3 Copyright holders will be forced to abandon oppressive licensing agreements
if a buyer can acquire alternate works under better terms. Only when
oppressive licensing combines with a licensee's inability to acquire alternative works should a misuse of copyright defense apply. Only under
these circumstances does the copyright begin to look more like a patent
than a copyright. 2 ' Any attempt to prevent other expressions of the
same idea or to alter the competitive marketplace would be outside the
copyright grant and would constitute misuse.23 3
The different effect that copyright has on the marketplace warrants a stricter analysis of what constitutes misuse in the copyright context. In determining whether a copyright holder has misused the copy-

sults from the distinction between patent and copyright subject matter. . . . In the copyright marketplace there can exist multiple expressions of an idea, each of which is, to a
greater or lesser degree, an acceptable substitute to the consumer.
Id. at 904.
For example, in ihe Lasercomb case there were several other suppliers of a program similar
to Interact. Appellee's Brief at 23; Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir.
1990). "The record below demonstrates that there are many competing computer-aided design
and computer-aided manufacturing software programs on the market available for use as substitutes for Interact." id.
231. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.09, at 13-144 to -145. "[S]ome courts
have indicated that a copyright owner will be denied relief in an infringement action if he is in
violation of the antitrust laws. Others, in denying such a defense, have rested at least in part upon
the limited nature of the particular monopoly in issue." Id. (footnotes omitted).
232. Courts should not allow a misuse of copyright defense to be asserted by a defendant
that has entered in to a "bad" deal when the opportunity existed to find a better deal.'Also, in
many of these situations the parties are both individuals with substantial business acumen. Courts
should not step in to invalidate an arm's length agreement.
233. See Stitt, supra note 230, at 904.
234. See Goldstein, supra note 227, at 1128 ("works of literature, art and music are highly
substitutable and that, in the usual case, copyright will not confer the degree of market power that
the patent misuse cases presuppose"); see also Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit stated: "In an appropriate case a misuse of
the copyright statute that in some way subverts the purpose of the statute-the promotion of
originality-might constitute a bar to judicial relief." Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 865.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
235. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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right, what is needed is a balancing of the plaintiff's market power 236
and the effect of the licensing agreement on the market.2 37 Judge Posner suggests that this balancing is best done under antitrust law:
"If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by
what principles shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in alternative
concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the date to try to
develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders
to debilitating uncertainty." This point applies with even 23
greater
force to
8
copyright misuse, where the danger of monopoly is less.

Antitrust law is aimed at preventing restraints of trade, the existence of monopolies, and anti-competitive practices. 23 9 The antitrust
laws are based on the premise that the public benefits most from a
competitive marketplace. 240 Thus, the goal of antitrust law is to ensure
that the spirit of free competition in the marketplace functions correctly. 241 It is appropriate that principles of antitrust law should govern
the determination of copyright misuse when anti-competition is alleged
as the misuse. 4 2

236. The term "market power" refers to the ability to "control or exclude competition."
United States v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). A well known treatise discusses market power in the following manner:
A number of evidentiary methods can be used to establish that the defendant [or plaintiff
in a copyright infringement action] has (market] power. Proof that the [plaintiff] accounts
for a high percentage of the total firm sales within the market . . .can be particularly
compelling evidence . . . as can be evidence that the [plaintiff] has actually exercised price
leadership control over the industry or has taken affirmative actions that have excluded
actual or potential competitors. Other useful indicators . . .include the size and competitive strengths of the [plaintiff] vis-a-vis its competitors ....
HOLMES, supra note 3, § 6.02[2], at 6-9 to 6-10 (footnotes omitted).
237. See USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
238. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc. 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir.
1987) (quoting USM, 694 F.2d at 512); see also Roger Arar, Note, Redefining Copyright Misuse,
81 COLUm. L. REV. 1291, 1307-14 (1981). "[l]t seems only proper that the misuse doctrine should
be outfitted with antitrust artillery, which is eminently suited to dealing with these precise forms
of abuse." Arar, supra, at 1311.
239. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1988); see also supra note 4 (the relevant language of each act). See generally LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN. THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 5 (1977).
240. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., .148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945).
241. See BOWMAN. supra note 22, at 1. "Insofar as the antitrust laws are successful, they
promote a market-oriented, profit-incentive process unimpeded by artificial roadblocks to efficiency. Such is the-rationale of market competition and the antitrust laws that support it." Id. at
2.
242. Courts have accepted copyright misuse founded on principles of antitrust violation. See
F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir.) (reversing the
district court's finding of an antitrust violation, 506 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1981) but stating
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Congress has accepted the theory of including antitrust analysis in
the misuse doctrine. Recently enacted legislation requires antitrust
analysis when determining patent misuse in a tie-in situation.24 3 Although Congress did not address the copyright misuse doctrine during
the passing of the 1988 Patent Misuse Act, Senator Dennis DeConcini,
the bill's sponsor, stated:
Our decision not to address copyright misuse should not be interpreted as
even tacit approval of that doctrine, as it now exists, if it now exists. The
so-called copyright misuse doctrine is vague and tenuous; unlike the doctrine of patent misuse, copyright misuse has little or no support in case
law and probably should be eliminated completely. We certainly would
not want to give any increased vitality to it through our action today on
the very different topic of patent misuse.244
The copyright misuse doctrine enunciated in Lasercomb is what Senator DeConcini feared: it is vague and tenuous.

denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1962); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 357, 364-65
(D. Del. 1980) (plaintiff's summary judgment motion denied as to copyright misuse and antitrust
counterclaim issues); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487, 488 (D.
Del. 1978) ("a defense that a plaintiff has misused copyrights allegedly infringed in a scheme
which violates the antitrust laws is no different from any other unclean hands defense"); see also
Alfred Bell & Co., v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); M. Witmark & Sons v.
Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed per curiam sub nom., M. Whitmark
& Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 117 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949). But see Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v.
Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). "As a general rule, it is no defense to a
copyright infringement claim that the copyright owner is violating the antitrust laws." Id. at 686;
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Grant's Cabin Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 633 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Peter
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Harms, Inc. v Sansom House Enters., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1958), affd sub nom., Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew
Tendler Tavern, Inc., 267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1959). Although decided a number of years ago this
line of cases remains good law.
In trademark law, an antitrust violation involving the trademark appears to be a prerequisite
for a finding that a trademark is unenforceable. See Lanham Act section 33(b)(7), recognizing an
antitrust violation as a defense to the incontestability of a registered mark. 15 U.S.C. §
II 15(b)(7) (1988); see also Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1991) (author suggesting a two-step analysis for copyright misuse reflecting both pro-competition and pro-dissemination of ideas principles).
243. In 1988 Congress amended section 271(d) of the Patent Act to provide that a patent
owner may not be deemed guilty of misuse because the patent owner has:
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any
rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license rights
in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances,
the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented
product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §
271(d)(4), (5) (1988)) (emphasis added). For a detailed discussion of the 1988 Patent Misuse
Reform Act see Calkins, supra note 155, at 175 (primary effect of Patent Misuse Reform Act is
to eliminate the presumption that a tie-in license involving a patent is per se misuse).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
244. 133 CONG. REC. S10275 (daily ed. July 21, 1987).
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Judge Sprouse's reliance on a "public policy" test to establish
copyright misuse creates-a vague and standardless doctrine which prevents predictable application of the misuse defense. 4 5 Incorporating
antitrust principles would add stability and predictability to the doctrine of misuse, thereby removing the fears articulated by Senator
DeConcini. Copyright misuse would be appropriate when the copyright
holder exhibited a degree of dominance over the market which forced a
buyer to deal only with that specific copyright owner."' In the absence
of such market power, however, a finding of copyright misuse would be
inappropriate." 7
The Supreme Court's decisions in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,2 48 United States v. Loew's Inc." 9
and United States v. ParamountPictures 5° also support the conclusion
that a finding of copyright misuse should be gauged by antitrust principles. 5 1 In each of these cases, the copyright holder had some degree of
market control that enabled each to abuse the copyright grant. 252 In

245. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978. "The question is not whether the copyright is being used
in a manner violative of antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agreement is "reasonable"),
but whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in
the of a grant copyright." Id. (emphasis added); see also Note, supra note 242, at 1295. "The
problem with the scope-of-the-grant formulation is that it presupposes some transcendent notion
of what constitutes 'natural' or 'proper' patent or copyright exploitation and thus fails to identify
any legal rules or standards for fixing the boundaries of legitimate conduct." Note, supra note
242, at 1295 (footnotes omitted).
246. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). Copyright owners may sometimes
enjoy analogous market dominance over their copyrighted articles enabling them to exert anticompetitive pressure in noncopyrighted articles. See id. at 45.
247. See Thomas M. Susman, Tying, Refusals to License, and Copyright Misuse: The Patent Misuse Model, 36 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 300, 322 (1989). "[C]ourts should hold that a copyright owner should be denied enforcement of his right by virtue of misuse only where the antitrust
laws have been violated by his use of the copyright." Id.
248. 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text (disscussing this
case).
249. 371 U.S. 38 (1962); see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing this
case).
250. 344 U.S. 131 (1948); see supra note 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing this
case).
251. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24-25; Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45-46; Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157.
252. See Broadcast Music. Inc., 441 U.S. at 5; Loew's, 371 U.S. at 40-43; Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. at 149. In Broadcast Music, the defendants had control over nearly every
domestic copyrighted composition in the country which enabled them to force licensees to accept
blanket licensing. 441 U.S. at 4. Justice White, writing for the majority, stated:
Although the copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to fix prices among
themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws, we would not expect that any market
arrangements reasonably necessary to effectuate the rights that are granted would be
deemed a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 19. Apparently the Court agreed, at least in principle, that the antitrust laws define the
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Loew's and Paramount Pictures, the Supreme Court cited the patent
misuse decisions of Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. 253 and Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. 25 4 (Mercoid I) as support
for antitrust liability, suggesting that conduct constituting antitrust violations in the patent context could constitute misuse in the copyright

context.255
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that an antitrust violation is not
necessary to establish copyright misuse fails to recognize the different
effect that copyrights and patents have on the market. 256 The court's
reliance on a "public policy" test to establish copyright misuse creates
a standardless doctrine.2 57 Thus, copyright owners will be forced to
speculate whetlher a licensing agreement will fall within a particular
court's view of the public policy underlying copyright, thereby preventing predictable application of the misuse defense.2 58 This vague standard places copyright holders in the unfortunate position of not knowing exactly what may constitute a misuse.
In addition, this decision will breed infringement. Potential infringers will now seek out agreements that appear to provide restrictive
anti-competitive clauses knowing that if they are charged with infringement, the copyright misuse defense may be available. Although the
Fourth Circuit states that this decision in no way invalidates the copyright holder's copyright,25 9 in many cases the burden of purging the

to the licensing of desirable films. 371 U.S. at 40-43. In Paramount Pictures, the defendants
pooled together to create a monopoly over motion pictures, effectively removing competition from
the market and then used the practice of block booking to force theaters to accept undesirable
films. 334 U.S. at 149.
253. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
254. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
255. See Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45-46; Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157.
256. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.

257.

Id.

258. Id.
259. Id. at 979. The Court stated "[t]his holding, of course, is not an invalidation of
Lasercomb's copyright. Lasercomb is free to bring a suit for infringement once it has purged itself
of the misuse." Id. at 979 n.22. The defense of misuse is only a temporary bar to relief. The
copyright owner's right to sue for infringement is restored once the misuse conduct has been effectively purged. See Aleden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 900, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). "An illegal combination of copyrights and a pooling
of the proceeds derived from the licensing of the copyrights through the illegal combination, renders unenforceable the rights granted under the Copyright Act, at least while the illegal combination continues." Id.
The Lasercomb Court failed to state exactly how one purges itself of the misuse but referred
the reader to United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) and
Hensley Equipment Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 1967). Lasercomb, 911 F.2d
at 979. Although the Court provided little guidance as to how one purges misuse, Professor
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27
Chisum's treatise on patent law states that patent misuse may be purged in the following manner:
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misuse will be greater than recovering for the infringement.2 60 In many
cases, the failure to purge will lead to the inability of a copyright to
protect the rights provided by th6 Copyright Act.2 6 1 The copyright misuse doctrine should be applied sparingly because of the severe ramifications that a finding of copyright misuse can have on the ability to protect one's copyright.
V.

CONCLUSION

The copyright misuse doctrine has had a slow and troubled
growth. As an extension of the patent misuse doctrine, courts have
struggled to determine the appropriate scope of the doctrine as it is
applied to copyright. Considerable confusion also exists among the
lower courts over the extent of antitrust analysis required for a finding
of misuse. Their confusion is attributable to the Supreme Court's failure to adequately address the issue.
The Fourth Circuit's attempt to explain and apply the copyright
misuse doctrine proceeded on a flawed interpretation of both the current scope of the misuse doctrine and the areas of copyright and patent
law. In formulating the scope of the copyright misuse doctrine, the
Fourth Circuit failed to recognize the current status of the patent misuse doctrine and the less restrictive impact a copyright has on the marketplace. This has created a vague and standardless test for determining copyright misuse, which the Supreme Court should clarify if given
the opportunity.
Sean Michael Aylward

To regain the right to relief, the owner must meet two requirements. The first is that
the abusive practice be completely abandoned. The abandonment may occur at any
time--even after the filing of the suit in which the question of misuse is raised. The abandonment [sic] need not take the particular form desired by the acctised infringer. Thus, if
the misuse is in the terms of licenses, the patent owner may simply cancel the licenses. In
Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson [329 F.2d 782](1964), the Ninth Circuit indicated
that the licensor must relinquish or cancel an offending license provision and not simply
rely on a policy of nonenforcement ...
The second requirement is that the consequences of the improper practice be fully
dissipated. This requirement is more difficult to apply. In [United States Gypsum v. National] Gypsum, [352 U.S. 457 (1957)], the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that abandonment of a practice plus passage of a period of time created an inference of dissipation.
CHIsUM. supra note 11, § 19.04[41, at 19-156 to -157 (footnotes omitted).
260. The Lasercomb case demonstrates this point because Lasercomb had sold approximately 40 licenses in the Interact program. 911 F.2d at 973 n.8. In order for Lasercomb to properly purge itself of the misuse it would have to prove that all 40 licenses were purged. See id. at
979 n.22. This would be a costly procedure for Lasercomb.
261. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the rights afforded by the CopyPublished
eCommons, 1991
Act).
rightby

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/27

